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Abstract. In this paper, we outline a cognitive architecture for communicators, 
called the BIC model. The model consist of three main components. First, a 
(B)iological component, in which the genetic or built-in capacities of the 
communicator are specified. Second, an (I)nteraction Engine which uses neo-
Gricean mutual simulation to attribute communicative intentions to signals, and 
to create signals to convey communicative intentions to the I-system of other 
agents. The third component of the BIC model is a  content addressable 
database of (C)onventions which is used to store form/meaning mappings that 
have been successfully computed by the I-system. These stored form/meaning 
mappings are indexed by types of communicative context, so they can be 
retrieved by the I-system to save computational resources. The model can be 
used both as a computational architecture for a communication module in an 
artificial agent and as a conceptual model of the human communicator. 
1   Introduction 
Claude Shannon's [1] influential treatment "A mathematical model of 
communication" still influences the way many cognitive scientists think about 
communication. However, Shannon's theory is a theory of data transmission, not of 
real communication between two autonomous agents. The point of his work was to 
show how a series of bits could reliably be transmitted over a channel of limited 
capacity, and how this data transmission could be made less susceptible to the main 
enemy of communication engineers: noise (see Figure 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Shannon's (1948) famous diagram 
When applied to communication between agents (either human or artificial) the 
transformations that take place at the transmitter and receiver's end take on a 
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Saussurean character: for successful communication, there has to be an unambiguous 
mapping of signals (e.g., bit streams or speech sounds) to meanings, and a mapping of 
meanings onto signals that is its inverse. In psycholinguistic models of 
communication, this assumption is reflected at the level of phonology, syntax, and 
semantics (see e.g. [2]). In artificial communicators this assumption still guides 
implementations of speech recognition, comprehension, and generation. These levels 
of representation enable the communicator to unambiguously map signals onto 
meanings and vice versa. In this framework, the only thing that can go wrong is - as in 
Shannon's theory - noise that disrupts the transmission of symbols (e.g. phonemes) 
which then obviously also disrupts the subsequent interpretation of the signal, because 
if the phonemes are wrongly recognized, the words and sentences will be wrongly 
recognized as well. While this is indeed one of the challenges any communicator has 
to meet, it is not the only challenge, and probably not the biggest one either. Indeed, 
having a bad phone connection when we talk to other humans, or having too much 
ambient noise for automatic speech recognition to operate reliably is disruptive to 
communication. 
A problem that is much harder to cope with is the pragmatics problem: in human 
communication, there is no 1:1 mapping between signals and their intended meanings. 
This is because the meaning of a communicative signal is not entirely fixed and 
context free, but depends on the communicative intention of the generator of that 
signal in a particular context (i.e., given a particular speaker, addressee, physical 
setting, and discourse history). The linguistic discipline of pragmatics is concerned 
with exploring this problem and its possible solutions, and the pragmatics literature is 
littered with examples showing that the mapping of signals to communicative 
intention is not 1 to 1, but rather Many to Many [3-6]. That is to say, every signal can 
convey many different communicative intentions, and every communicative intention 
can be conveyed by generating many different signals. For example, the phrase "thank 
you" can be intended as the expression of gratitude (when accepting a gift), the 
expression of annoyance (e.g. ironically, after someone has just dropped his coffee in 
your lap), or even as a request (a tennis umpire trying to quieten down the spectators 
during a match). However, the tennis umpire can also try to quieten down the 
spectators be saying "please be quiet", "quiet please", or "shhhhhht!". To complicate 
things further, communicators not only use language to communicate, but also facial 
expressions, gestures, eye-gaze, and functionally motivated actions (e.g. placing the 
book one wants to buy on the counter of the shop). For these nonverbal signals, it is 
even harder to establish an unambiguous meaning associated with it, as there are no 
"dictionaries" to guide us. 
In this paper, we outline a blueprint (which we call 'the BIC model') for a real 
communication module, one that incorporates the pragmatics problem by making it 
central. The model is intended to serve as an architectural guideline for 
communication modules in artificial systems, but is also sufficiently general to use as 
a cognitive-psychological model of communication between any possible 
combination of humans, animals, and machines. The core assumption of the model is 
that for real communication, there are three distinct and essential components needed: 
a set of "biological" or "built in" constraints (the B-system), an interaction engine or 
social-interactional cognition component along the lines of [7] (the I-system), and a 
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content-addressable database containing conventions (the C-system). We now discuss 
the components of the BIC model, its implementation and some of its applications. 
2   Biological or Built-in Constraints 
Whether biological or artificial, an agent that communicates has physical constraints 
that limit the type of signals that it can produce and perceive. Robots have cameras 
with a certain resolution and sampling rate, humans have eyes with specific 
perceptual limitations (e.g. the visible colors). Robot use microphones, while humans 
have ears. Both can detect only a limited range of frequencies. These constraints limit 
the possible signals, with consequences for the way communication proceeds. In 
humans, the B-system also represents whatever communicative intelligence is innate, 
and is responsible for the human infant to start 'bootstrapping' into communication 
(e.g. by responding to certain frequency patterns, recognizing its mother's face, etc.). 
This is necessary, as the C(onvention)-system, discussed below, is assumed to still be 
empty in the newborn infant. In a communication device a la Shannon (e.g. a 
computer modem) the B-system is the capacity to distinguish 1s and 0s, leading to the 
capability to receive a sequence of 'bits'. The same holds for production: a robot has a 
number of output devices (a speaker, a head, a face, hands, etc) just as humans have 
faces, a voice, eyes etc. Even in the simple case of the Shannon device, a modem 
should be capable of creating 0s and 1s to send messages to the other side. 
The anatomy of the human body, including its articulatory organs, is subject to 
constraints that are determined by the genetic make-up of homo sapiens. In the case of 
Robots, these constraints are in its physical design, and ideally these are as similar as 
possible to the human constraints, but this is generally not the case. While a range of 
artificial sensors exist that are more sensitive and accurate than the human receptors, 
there are as yet no artificial effectors more dextrous and flexible than the human hand. 
3   The Interaction Engine 
The Interaction Engine, or I-system, is a processor that is central in the BIC model. It 
has three main tasks. First, it performs the computations necessary to attribute a 
communicative intention to the sender of received signals (delivered to it via the 
B-system). Second, it performs the computations necessary to generate signals that 
will enable others' I-systems to successfully attribute communicative intentions. 
These two functions are essential, because of the pragmatics problem mentioned in 
the introduction: the Many to Many relationship of signals to communicative 
intentions. A third and important additional function of the I-system is to manage the 
C-system (the database of stored conventions), which will be discussed below. 
Importantly, the I-system is modality-independent; it will process a verbal utterance, 
the raising of an eyebrow, or gestures that accompany speech (see [8]) in the same 
way. 
There have been different proposals about how to design an I-system. In the 
dialogue processing model of Pickering & Garrod [2] the I-system is assumed to be 
unnecessary most of the time. It only kicks into action when special conditions apply, 
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such as persistent misunderstandings or deliberate deception. According to Pickering 
and Garrod, the reflexive computations that are presumably involved in solving the 
pragmatics problem are computationally too expensive to be constantly governing 
ordinary communication. 
In the approach to the pragmatics problem called relevance theory by Sperber & 
Wilson [6] it is assumed that the correct form/meaning mapping can be extracted by 
giving precedence to inferences that maximize 'relevance' while minimizing the 
cognitive effort needed to compute it. In contrast to Pickering and Garrod, Sperber 
and Wilson do claim that some type of inferential processing is necessary for 
communication, but they differ from the Gricean approach [3, 9] in the way this 
processing is performed. They assume that Grice's maxim of Relevance is central, and 
sufficient. 
The approach we take for building an I-system is essentially neo-Gricean, 
following Levinson [5, 7]. We propose that the I-system solves the pragmatics 
problem by using conceptual simulation of the interlocutor(s).  In short, senders of 
signals simulate how a receiver would interpret the signal, and receivers simulate how 
a sender could have decided to send that particular signal. Recent neurocognitive 
findings from the EU funded project JAST have shown that communicators solving 
the pragmatics problem while sending signals activate the same well-identified brain 
region as receivers do while solving the pragmatics problem for comprehension [10]. 
We call this type of simulation conceptual to distinguish it from sensori-motor 
simulation, as has been proposed by researchers who study "mirror neurons" [11]1. In 
a conceptual simulation, what is simulated are the inferences of the interlocutor, given 
a certain set of propositions about the world (i.e., his beliefs and desires, see e.g. [12]) 
and a certain signal that is received or being sent. Such a simulation can never be 
perfect, as information about the beliefs and desires of others is always incomplete. 
However, propositions of which the truth value is both unknown and essential for the 
inferences at hand are assumed to be copied from the communicator's own beliefs and 
desires. (In any case, it is not critical to have an exact copy of your interlocutor's 
mental state, but to have one that is 'sufficient for current purposes'; Clark [13]) This 
is a computational heuristic that leads to a degree of 'egocentrism' in communication. 
Evidence suggests that communicators often do not take current common ground 
among interlocutors into account, for instance in producing and understanding 
referring expressions [14-17]. While communication proceeds, participants gradually 
build up a more and more accurate representation of the other (or, to put it in other 
words, they will develop more and more common ground, see [18]) which enables 
them to take their interlocutor's perspective into account. This process is beautifully 
illustrated in an experiment by Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs [19], in which communicators 
are shown to gradually establish so called conceptual pacts, which are essentially 
form/meaning mappings that have been implicitly agreed upon by communicators. 
Updating our model of interlocutors during the course of communication has been 
called grounding by Clark & Schaefer [20]. 
While we propose to build an I-system based on mutual simulation, we appreciate 
the point by [14-17] and others that reflexive computations can be expensive. To 
                                                          
1
  In the fMRI study reported in De Ruiter et al., there was no activation in the mirror neuron 
areas while communicators were trying to solve the pragmatics problem. 
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avoid this resource bottleneck, the I-system can store the results of its pragmatic 
simulations in the C-system, which constitutes a content-addressable database of 
recurrent form/meaning mappings. Take for example the following short dialogue: 
 
A: What did you think of Steve's latest book? 
B: It put me to sleep. 
 
The first time A encounters B's response, she might well need to engage in 
conceptual simulation to extract the communicative intention from the speech "It put 
me to sleep" (as the 'literal' meaning does not make much sense), but after having 
inferred (and validated, through grounding) the communicative intention of the 
utterance, the mapping of the signal "X put me to sleep" onto the communicative 
intention "I want you to know that I found X rather boring" can be stored for later use. 
Thus, we now discuss the third and final component of the BIC model, the C-system. 
4   Conventions 
Efficient communication between agents is impossible without the ability to rely on 
socially shared conventions about what signals mean. For example, most if not all 
implemented models for linguistic communication contain a lexicon, a database that 
stores the relationship between the surface form of words and their associated 
meanings. However, storing conventional form/meaning mappings need not be 
limited to words. It can also be used to store mappings between phrases and their 
associated communicative intention. For example, the phrase "How are you?" is 
frequently not a request for information, but a greeting, and storing this mapping can 
save the I-system a lot of processing cycles. Similarly, parameterized templates could 
be stored as well. The form "Could you <VP>?" is most often a polite request to VP. 
Again, storing this mapping avoids having the I-system compute the communicative 
intention from scratch every time it is encountered. 
Syntactic rules also establish a system of shared rules that govern the ordering of 
and mutual relations between linguistic symbols. At a more peripheral level of 
processing, the same holds for phonology. In fact, traditional linguistics has mainly 
focused on charting out the conventions governing linguistic competence. However, 
we see the C-system as a place to store not only the general linguistic competence of 
the language user, but also aspects related to performance, or language use. For 
instance, the conceptual pacts studied by Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs [19] can be treated as 
local conventions, conventions that only apply for a certain context and with a certain 
interlocutor. A good example of local conventions can be found in the domain of 
person reference [21]. In a limited social group where everybody is assumed to know 
him, an individual can be referred to as "Herb", but in the wider context of a 
psycholinguistics conference, the reference "Professor Clark" might be needed to 
achieve recognition. The localized nature of conventions represents a challenge for 
the implementation of the C-system. Conventions have a "social scope" which needs 
not only to be represented in the C-system, but in fact provides an essential retrieval 
key. If I want to refer to a person, I do not want to look through all the social groups I 
am a part of in sequence before deciding on a reference: I want to be able to index the 
retrieval of the reference by the social group or individual I am designing my person 
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reference for. A similar argument can be made for the context of communication. 
When I'm socializing in a bar with my friends, other conventions apply than when I 
am in a formal meeting at work, even if I am in that meeting with the same people. By 
using both the social scope and the social context as a retrieval cue for the C-system, 
the I-system can retrieve those conventions that are 'relevant' to the situation at hand 
first, before considering other conventions. 
To summarize, when the I-system receives a signal via the receptors of the 
B-system, it first checks the C-system to see if that signal with that context (or parts 
thereof) has been stored. If it has, the I-system will use that stored mapping as a basis 
for attributing a communicative intention to the signal. If it is not, the I-system will 
engage in simulation of the interlocutor, and try to compute the communicative 
intention. If this turned out to be the correct interpretation, it will store the newly 
found mapping into the C-system. Analogously, if the I-system needs to produce a 
signal to get across a certain communicative intention, it will first look in the 
C-system to see if it contains a previously stored meaning-form mapping that can be 
used. If not, it will engage in simulation (of the receiver) to generate a signal that 
might work. If it turns out to have worked, this new mapping will also be stored in the 
C-system for later work. To optimize retrieval efficiency, the C-system is a content-
addressable database that allows social scope and context to be used as retrieval keys. 
5   Summary 
In this paper we have outlined a blueprint for a communication module (see Figure 2). 
It is based on three essential components: (1) a set of biological (hard-wired) 
constraints that define the properties of the possible incoming and outgoing signals, 











Fig. 2. General layout of the BIC architecture for agent-agent communication 
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needed to solve the pragmatics problem of mapping communicative intentions to 
signals and vice versa, and (3) a database of socially shared communicative 
conventions about the mappings between signals and communicative intentions. The 
more "experience" the system will have, the more sophisticated and efficient it will 
operate. For the implementation of the I-system, we propose to use neo-Gricean 
mutual simulation, combined with rational use of the C-system to take shortcuts 
whenever possible. 
The BIC model can be used both as a conceptual model in the study of agent-agent 
communication (including HCI), and as a blueprint for an implementation of a 
communication module in artificial agents. This way, insights about communication 
between agents can flow in both directions. Challenges arising from implementing a 
communication module in agents can stimulate interesting new research issues in 
human-human communication, and existing knowledge of the latter can be used to 
improve the quality of our implementations in artificial agents. 
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